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Abstract
The paper compares welfare under an emission tax with that under an emission quota
in a mixed duopoly where a private ﬁrm is partly owned by foreign investors. It shows that
an emission tax is more (less) welfare improving than an emission quota when the foreign
investors’ share is high (low). We note that the government chooses such a high tax level that
it cannot earn the tax revenue from the private ﬁrm in the equilibrium.
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??Introduction
The last several years have seen research concerning environmental problems in the con-
text of mixed oligopoly theory. Of particular interest is the eﬀect of an emission tax, addressed
in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2006), Beladi and Chao (2006), Chen and Wang (2010), Ohori
(2006a, 2006b), Pal and Saha (2010), Wang and Wang (2009), and Wang et al. (2009). The
eﬀect of an emission tax has naturally been analyzed in the framework of pure oligopoly
theory and further examined in the context of identifying a welfare-superior regime among
market-based instruments, such as emission taxes and tradable emission permits or among
those instruments and command-and-control regulations, such as emission standards and quo-
tas. See, for example, Denicolo` (1999), Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003), Lahiri and Ono
(2007), Requate (1993), and Spulber (1985).
Naito and Ogawa (2009) and Kato (2011) favor a welfare-superior regulation in the choice
of an environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly. These studies consider only cases in which
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the competitor of the public ﬁrm is a private ﬁrm owned only by domestic investors. However,
in the real globalized world, the competitor of the public ﬁrm is not always a private ﬁrm
whose owners are only domestic investors.1? This raises a question: Do the results of the
previous studies also hold when foreign ownership of the private ﬁrm is allowed? This paper
tries to answer this question by comparing welfare across emission tax and quota regimes in
a mixed duopoly where the private ﬁrm is owned by both domestic and foreign investors.
The works most related to this paper are Ohori (2011) and Kato (2011). Ohori (2011)
investigates the eﬀects of foreign ownership of a domestic ﬁrm in a pure oligopoly on the
design of environmental policy and, in particular, compares two environmental policy types:
an emission tax and an emission quota.2? He ﬁnds that the emission tax is welfare inferior
to an emission quota in a pure duopoly where two private ﬁrms, one completely owned by
foreign investors and the other by domestic investors, compete with each other. Kato (2011)
shows that an emission tax is always welfare inferior to an emission quota in a mixed duopoly
where the private ﬁrm is entirely owned by domestic investors and the public ﬁrm’s objective
is to maximize both the consumer’s and the producer’s surplus. These studies show that a
command-and-control regulation is more welfare enhancing than a market-based instrument
in a duopoly. In contrast, we show that the emission tax is more welfare improving than an
emission quota in a mixed duopoly when the foreign investors’ share in the private ﬁrm is
high.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our basic model. Sections
3 and 4 derive the equilibrium outcomes under an emission tax and an emission quota in
a mixed duopoly, and Section 5 compares the equilibrium outcomes and welfare of the two
regulations. Section 6 provides a brief remark of the model.
1?The analyses associated with foreign ownerships in a mixed duopoly has been increasing in recent
days (Cato and Matsumura, 2012; Han and Ogawa, 2009; Lin and Matsumura, 2012; Matsumura
et al., 2009; Wang and Chen, 2011; Wang and Lee, 2013).
2?Ohori (2011) does not use the term “emission quota” but “emission standard”. In his model,
emission standard is such a regulation that the upper limit of net emission is imposed on ﬁrms.
Kato (2011) calls this type of regulation as emission quota. In addition, in Naito and Ogawa
(2009), emission standard is deﬁned as imposing the minimum limit of abatement eﬀort on ﬁrms.
To uniform the terms in this paper, we describe emission standard in Ohori (2011) as emission
quota.
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??Model
We basically follow the model used by Kato (2011). Consider an industry with two ﬁrms
– one public (ﬁrm 0), whose objective is to maximize the sum of the consumer’s and the pro-
ducer’s surplus, and the other private (ﬁrm 1), whose objective is to maximize its own proﬁts.
They produce a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function of the good is given by
p = α −X, where X = x0 + x1 denotes the total output, xi (i = 0, 1) denotes the output of
ﬁrm i, p denotes the price of the good, and α > 0. Both ﬁrms have symmetric production
cost functions given by cpi (xi) = cx
2
i /2.
Pollution ei is generated by production. Producing one unit of output generates one
unit of pollution. Firms can reduce their pollution by reducing their output or by investing
abatement eﬀort ai. The emission of ﬁrm i can be represented as ei = max{xi − ai, 0}. The
abatement cost function of ﬁrm i is cai (ai) = ka
2
i /2. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by
πi(x0, x1, ai) = (α−X)xi − cx
2
i
2
− ka
2
i
2
. ?1?
Welfare is the sum of the consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus, and environmental
damage. It is given by
W (x0, x1, a0, a1) =
∫ X
0
(α− s)ds− (α−X)X + π0 + (1− γ)π1 − (e0 + e1)
2
2
,?2?
where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the foreign private investors’ share in the private ﬁrm and the last
term of W represents the environmental damage.
In this paper, we assume that c = k = 1. Kato (2011) shows that welfare under the
emission quota is always larger than that under emission tax when c ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1. As the
main purpose of this paper is to examine whether there exists the case where the emission tax
is a welfare-superior regulation to the emission quota in the framework of his setting except
for the ownerships of the private ﬁrm, we assume c = k = 1.
The decision-making sequence of the government and ﬁrms is as follows. First, the govern-
ment chooses the level of regulation given the kind of the environmental policy – emission tax
or emission quota. Then, both ﬁrms simultaneously choose their outputs xi and abatement
eﬀorts ai. We analyze this game structure under an emission tax and an emission quota.
??Emission tax
Consider a situation in which the government imposes an emission tax. The maximization
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problem of each ﬁrm is given by
max
x0,a0
U t(x0, x1, a0, a1, t), s.t. e0 ≥ 0, ?3?
max
x1,a1
π1(x0, x1, a1)− te1, s.t. e1 ≥ 0, ?4?
where U t(x0, a0, x1, a1, t) =
∫X
0 (α− s)ds− (α−X)X + π0 − te0 + (1− γ)(π1 − te1). We note
that the above maximization problems have the constraints; we use the Lagrange multiplier
and denote the following Lagrangian function of each ﬁrm.
LU t = U t + λ0(x0 − a0), ?5?
Lπt1 = π1 − te1 + λ1(x1 − a1). ?6?
In the subsequent analyses, we calculate the ﬁrst order condition of the above Lagrangian
function of each ﬁrm and derive the equilibrium outcome in the second stage by considering
whether the emission constraint of each ﬁrm is binding or not: We will separate four cases
in this process: Case (bn) the constraint is binding only for the public ﬁrm, λ0 > 0 and λ1
= 0; Case (nb) the constraint is binding only for the private ﬁrm, λ0 = 0 and λ1 > 0; Case
(bb) the constraints are binding for both ﬁrms, λ0 and λ1 > 0; Case (nn) the constraint is
non-binding for neither ﬁrms, λ0 and λ1 = 0.
Calculating the equilibrium outcome in the second stage with paying attention to the
above cases, we obtain the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 In the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is as follows:
(xt0, x
t
1, a
t
0, a
t
1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
(2 + γ)(α− t)
5 + γ
,
α− t
5 + γ
, t, t
)
if t ∈
[
0,
α
6 + γ
)
,
(
(3 + γ)α− 4t
7 + γ
,
α+ t
7 + γ
, t,
α+ t
7 + γ
)
if t ∈
[
α
6 + γ
,
(3 + γ)α
11 + γ
)
,
(
(3 + γ)α
11 + γ
,
2α
11 + γ
,
(3 + γ)α
11 + γ
,
2α
11 + γ
)
if t ∈
[
(3 + γ)α
11 + γ
,∞
)
,
Proof See Appendix A.
The superscript t (q) on xi and ai represents the equilibrium outcome in the second stage
under the emission tax (quota). Lemma 1 implies that both ﬁrms discharge the emission and
choose their abatement eﬀorts so as to be equal to the emission tax level when the emission
tax level is low. However, when the emission tax level increases, ﬁrst, the private ﬁrm stops
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discharging its emission. This is caused by the diﬀerence of the objectives between the public
and private ﬁrms: The public ﬁrm has an stronger incentive to produce since the objective of
the public ﬁrm includes consumers’ surplus and does not include the environmental damage.
The output and the gross emission of the private ﬁrm are smaller than those of the public
ﬁrm because the strategic substitution eﬀect works. The abatement eﬀort increases with the
emission tax level, and thus, the private ﬁrm decides not to discharge its emission. Finally,
both ﬁrm stops discharging when the tax level is suﬃciently large.
The government chooses the second-best emission tax level to maximize welfare given
Lemma 1. Note that welfare under emission tax is deﬁned as W t(q0, q1, a0, a1, t) =
∫X
0 (α −
s)ds − (α − X)X + π0 − te0 + (1 − γ)(π1 − te1) + t(e0 + e1) − (e0 + e1)2/2. By the simple
calculation, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 1. The equilibrium emission tax level is
tT =
(34 + 14γ + γ2)α
197 + 40γ + 2γ2
.
2. The equilibrium outcome in the full game under the emission tax is as follows:
xT0 =
(65 + 28γ + 2γ2)α
ΔT
, xT1 =
3(11 + γ)α
ΔT
,
aT0 =
(34 + 14γ + γ2)α
ΔT
, aT1 =
3(11 + γ)α
ΔT
,
eT0 =
(31 + 14γ + γ2)α
ΔT
, eT1 = 0, t
T =
(34 + 14γ + γ2)α
ΔT
,
XT =
(98 + 31γ + 2γ2)α
ΔT
, AT =
(67 + 17γ + γ2)α
ΔT
,
ET =
(31 + 14γ + γ2)α
ΔT
, WT =
(104− 2γ − γ2)α2
2ΔT
,
where ΔT = 197 + 40γ + 2γ2 > 0.
Proof See Appendix B.
The superscript T (Q) represents the equilibrium outcome in the full game under the
emission tax (quota). The rational intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. There are
two distortions in this economy: the environmental problem and mixed oligopoly. However,
the government can use only one instrument: an emission tax. To control the production of
the public ﬁrm with increasing the abatement eﬀort, the government chooses the emission tax
level so as to be moderately high. If its level is suﬃciently high, the output of the public ﬁrm
does not depend on the emission tax level, and thus the government cannot control it. We
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should note that this result can be obtained regardless of γ. The government cannot earn
the tax revenue from the private ﬁrm even if the private ﬁrm is perfectly owned by foreign
investors.
??Emission quota
In this section, we derive the equilibrium outcome for an emission quota. The maximiza-
tion problems of ﬁrm 0 and ﬁrm 1 are given by
max
x0,a0
W (x0, x1, a0, a1) s.t. e¯ ≥ e0, ?7?
max
x1,a1
π1(x0, x1, a1) s.t. e¯ ≥ e1. ?8?
As is the similar manner to the emission tax, we derive the equilibrium outcome in the
second stage by separating whether the emission quota of each ﬁrm is binding or not: e¯ ≥ ei.
We use the Lagrange multiplier and denote the following Lagrangian function of each ﬁrm.
LUq = U q + μ0(e¯− x0 + a0), ?9?
Lπq1 = π1 + μ1(e¯− x1 + a1), ?10?
where U q =
∫X
0 (α− s)ds− (α−X)X + π0 + (1− γ)π1.
In the subsequent analyses, we calculate the ﬁrst order condition of the above Lagrangian
function of each ﬁrm and derive the equilibrium outcome in the second stage by considering
whether the emission quota of each ﬁrm is binding or not: We will separate four cases in this
process: Case (BN) the quota is binding only for the public ﬁrm, μ0 > 0 and μ1 = 0; Case
(NB) the quota is binding only for the private ﬁrm, μ0 = 0 and μ1 > 0; Case (BB) the quotas
are binding for both ﬁrms, μ0 and μ1 > 0; Case (NN) the quota is non-binding for neither
ﬁrms, μ0 and μ1 = 0.
Calculating the equilibrium outcome in the second stage with paying attention to the
above cases, we obtain the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 In the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is as follows:
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q
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q
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q
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)
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0,
2α
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)
,
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8 + γ
,
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8 + γ
,
(2 + γ)α− (5 + γ)e¯
8 + γ
, 0
)
if e¯ ∈
[
2α
9 + γ
,
(2 + γ)α
5 + γ
)
,
(
(2 + γ)α
5 + γ
,
α
5 + γ
, 0, 0
)
if e¯ ∈
[
(2 + γ)α
5 + γ
,∞
)
,
Proof See Appendix C.
Lemma 2 implies that both ﬁrms discharge the emission by the upper limit of the emis-
sion quota when the quota level is low. However, when the quota level increases, the emission
constraint becomes loosen. First, the private ﬁrm stops abating investment, and ﬁnally both
ﬁrm stops abating when the quota level is suﬃciently high.
The government chooses the second-best emission quota level to maximize welfare given
Lemma 2. By the simple calculation, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 1. The equilibrium emission quota level is
e¯Q =
(59− 6γ − γ2)α
667 + 17γ − 15γ2 − γ3 .
2. Under the emission quota, the equilibrium outcome is given by
xQ0 =
(6− γ)(3 + γ)(11 + γ)α
ΔQ
, xQ1 =
2(6− γ)(11 + γ)α
ΔQ
,
aQ0 =
(139 + 57γ − 7γ2 − γ3)α
ΔQ
, aQ1 =
(73− 4γ − γ2)α
ΔQ
,
e¯Q = eQ0 = e
Q
1 =
(59− 6γ − γ2)α
ΔQ
, XQ =
(6− γ)(5 + γ)(11 + γ)α
ΔQ
,
AQ =
(212 + 53γ − 8γ2 − γ3)α
ΔQ
, EQ =
2(59− 6γ − γ2)α
ΔQ
,
WQ =
(6− γ)(59− 6γ − γ2)α2
2ΔQ
,
where ΔQ = 667 + 17γ − 15γ2 − γ3 > 0.
Proof See Appendix D.
We note that in the equilibrium, the emission quota is binding for both ﬁrms, that is,
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e¯i = ei. The rational intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Unlike the emission tax,
the emission quota can give ﬁrms room to choose the combination of output and abatement
eﬀort: the emission tax basically requires ﬁrms to choose their abatement eﬀort so as to be
equal to the emission tax level. When the regulation level is severe, the government can not
control both ﬁrms’ behaviors under the emission tax but can still control them to some extent
under the emission quota. Thus, the government can impose the severe emission constraint
on ﬁrms.
??Comparison of the equilibrium outcome under an emission tax and
that under an emission quota
Using the results of the previous section, we compare the equilibrium outcome and welfare
under the emission tax and those under the emission quota. First, we obtain the following
relationships of these equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 3
xT1 < x
Q
1 < x
Q
0 < x
T
0 , for all γ ∈ [0, 1],
aQ1 < a
T
1 < a
T
0 < a
Q
0 , for all γ ∈ [0, 1],
eT1 < e
Q
1 = e
Q
0 < e
T
0 , for all γ ∈ [0, 1],
XQ < XT , for all γ ∈ [0, 1],
AQ < AT , if and only if γ ∈ [0, γA),
ET < EQ, if and only if γ ∈ [0, γE),
where A and E denote the total abatement eﬀort and total emission, respectively and
γA  0.427 and γE  0.327.
Proof A simple comparison of the equilibrium outcomes yields the results in Proposition 3.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. As the public ﬁrm’s objective includes
consumer’s surplus, the public ﬁrm produces more than the private ﬁrm. Under the emission
tax, both ﬁrms basically choose the abatement eﬀort level which is independent of the output
level, whereas the ﬁrm can adjust the abatement eﬀort level by changing its output level as
long as the emission constraint is binding under the emission quota. This leads to the output
of the public ﬁrm is larger and that of the private ﬁrm is smaller under the emission tax than
those under the emission quota. Further it also causes the total output under the emission
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tax to be larger than that under the emission quota.
With respect to the abatement eﬀort and the emission of each ﬁrm, the emission tax es-
sentially causes the abatement eﬀort of each ﬁrm to be equated and the emission quota does
the emission of each ﬁrm to be equated in this model.3? Thus, the abatement eﬀorts of both
ﬁrms under the emission tax are in the range of (aQ1 , a
Q
0 ) and the emissions of the both ﬁrm
under the emission quota are in the range of (eT1 , e
T
0 ).
With respect to the total abatement eﬀort and the total emission, the magnitude relation-
ships varies with the value of γ. When γ increases, the gross emission increases (dXT /dγ > 0
and dXQ/dγ > 0), and, therefore, each environmental regulation becomes severe (dtT /dγ > 0
and de¯Q/dγ < 0); the public ﬁrm produces more to decrease the revenue of the private ﬁrm.
However, it does not reduce the emission under emission tax, though it does under emission
quota (dET /dγ > 0 and dEQ/dγ < 0); the output-expansion eﬀect dominates an increase of
abatement eﬀort under emission tax. As a result, the magnitude relationships of the total
emission between emission tax and emission quota changes when γ exceeds some threshold
γE .
Next, the following proposition shows the results of welfare comparison between the emis-
sion tax and the emission quota.
Proposition 4
WQ > WT if γ ∈ [0, γ¯),
WT ≥ WQ otherwise,
where γ¯ ( 0.073) is the sollution of WT − WQ = 0 and the strict inequality holds when
γ = γ¯.
Proof See Appendix E.
The intuition behind proposition 4 is as follows. When γ is low, welfare is smaller under
the emission tax than under the emission quota, though consumer’s surplus is larger and the
environmental damage is smaller under the emission tax than emission quota. This is because
the proportion of producer’s surplus (π0 + (1 − γ)π1) in welfare is larger under low γ and
the public ﬁrm produces its output such that the price (P (X)) is slightly smaller than the
3? In fact, as the emission constraint of the private ﬁrm is binding under the emission tax, the abate-
ment eﬀorts of both ﬁrms are not the same but still similar by compared with those under the
emission quota.
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marginal cost, c′(q0). In this case, the degradation of producer’s surplus by the ineﬃciency
of the production allocation is quite large under the emission tax and this eﬀect aﬀects on
welfare in a large scale. However, when γ is high, this result is opposite. As a result, the
degradation of producer’s surplus does not much matter by compared to the case where γ is
low, the emission tax is superior to the emission quota.
??Concluding remarks
The paper compares an emission tax with an emission quota in a mixed duopoly where
a private ﬁrm is owned by not only domestic but foreign investors. We show that emission
tax is more welfare improving (worsening) than an emission tax when the share of the foreign
investors for the private ﬁrm is high (low). From our results and Kato (2011), we should
pay attention to the share of foreign investors in the private ﬁrm when we determine the
environmental policies.
We’ll mention one remark. Under the emission tax, the government cannot earn the tax
revenue from the private ﬁrm. Here, we relax the assumption of the emission; ﬁrms can abate
not only its own emission but also the rival’s emission, that is, ei is allowed to be negative
under the emission tax. In this case, when γ is high, the emission of the private ﬁrm is neg-
ative: The government pays the reward for the abatement to the private ﬁrm. Even in this
setting, the similar results to the main text are still obtained. From these results, we should
mind that the result that the emission tax is superior to the emission quota when the private
ﬁrm is owned by a large proportion of the foreign investors is not obtain from the reason that
the government can earn the positive tax revenue from the private ﬁrm.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1 Case (bb): First, emission constraint of each ﬁrm is binding, therefore, λ0 > 0
and λ1 > 0. The ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem of each ﬁrm is as follows.
∂LU t
∂x0
= α+ λ0 − 2x0 − x1(1− γ)− t = 0, ?11?
∂LU t
∂a0
= −a0 − λ0 + t = 0, ?12?
∂LU t
∂λ0
= x0 − a0 = 0, ?13?
∂Lπt1
∂x1
= α+ λ1 − x0 − 3x1 − t = 0, ?14?
∂Lπt1
∂a1
= −a1 − λ1 + t = 0, ?15?
∂Lπt1
∂λ1
= x1 − a1 = 0. ?16?
To solve the above ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain
xbb0 =
(3 + γ)α
11 + γ
, xbb1 =
2α
11 + γ
,
abb0 =
(3 + γ)α
11 + γ
, abb1 =
2α
11 + γ
,
ebb0 = 0, e
bb
1 = 0,
λbb0 = − (3 + γ)α− (11 + γ)t
11 + γ
, λbb1 = −2α− (11 + γ)t
11 + γ
,
where the superscript bb denotes the equilibrium outcome in Case (bb). In what follows, this super-
script is also used to represent the above meaning.
As both λbb0 and λ
bb
1 have to be positive, and therefore, Case (bb) exists in t > (3+γ)α/(11+γ).
From the comparison of λbb0 and λ
bb
1 , the emission constraint is more severe for ﬁrm 1: There exist
such tax levels that λbb1 < 0 and λ
bb
0 > 0. And therefore, there does not exist Case (bn): Emission
constraint of ﬁrm 0 is binding and that of ﬁrm 1, not binding, that is, λ0 > 0 and λ1 = 0.
Case (nb): Next, we consider Case (nb) where emission constraint of ﬁrm 0 is not binding and
that of ﬁrm 1, binding, that is, λ0 = 0 and λ1 > 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
∂LU t
∂x0
= α− 2x0 − x1(1− γ)− t = 0, ?17?
∂LU t
∂a0
= −a0 + t = 0, ?18?
∂Lπt1
∂x1
= α+ λ1 − x0 − 3x1 − t = 0, ?19?
∂Lπt1
∂a1
= −a1 − λ1 + t = 0, ?20?
∂Lπt1
∂λ1
= x1 − a1 = 0. ?21?
To solve the above ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain
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xnb0 =
(3 + γ)α− 4t
7 + γ
, xnb1 =
α+ t
7 + γ
,
anb0 = t, a
nb
1 =
α+ t
7 + γ
,
enb0 =
(3 + γ)α− (11 + γ)t
7 + γ
, enb1 = 0,
λnb0 = 0, λ
nb
1 = −α− (6 + γ)t
7 + γ
.
As both λnb1 and e
nb
0 have to be positive, and therefore, Case (nb) exists when α/(6 + γ) < t <
(3 + γ)α/(11 + γ).
Case (nn): Finally, we consider Case (nn): emission constraints are not binding for both ﬁrms,
λ0 and λ1 = 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
∂LU t
∂x0
= α− 2x0 − x1(1− γ)− t = 0, ?22?
∂LU t
∂a0
= −a0 + t = 0, ?23?
∂Lπt1
∂x1
= α− x0 − 3x1 − t = 0, ?24?
∂Lπt1
∂a1
= −a1 + t = 0. ?25?
To solve the above ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain
xnn0 =
(2 + γ)(α− t)
5 + γ
, xnn1 =
α− γ
5 + γ
,
ann0 = t, a
nn
1 = t,
enn0 =
(2 + γ)α− (7 + 2γ)t
5 + γ
, enn1 =
α− (6 + γ)t
5 + γ
.
In this case, enn0 and e
nn
1 have to be positive, therefore, Case (nn) exists in the range where
t < α/(6 + γ).
Summing up these results, we obtain Lemma 1.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1 Substituting xt0, x
t
1, a
t
0, and a
t
1 into W
t(x0, x1, a0, a1, t), we derive welfare level
in each case and deﬁne W˜ (t) = W (xt0, x
t
1, a
t
0, a
t
1, t).
First, we consider the case where t < α/(6+γ). In this case, we calculate the ﬁrst-order condition
of the maximization problem of the government is
W˜ ′(t) =
(38 + 27γ + 4γ2)α− (233 + 136γ + 23γ2 + γ3)t
(5 + γ2)
= 0.
To solve the above equation, we obtain
tnn =
(38 + 27γ + 4γ2)α
233 + 136γ + 23γ2 + γ3
?26?
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Here, we have to check tnn < α/(6 + γ). From the comparison, we obtain
tnn <
α
(6 + γ)
if γ ∈
[
0,
−13 +√181
6
)
,
tnn ≥ α
(6 + γ)
if γ ∈
[
−13 +√181
6
, 1
]
.
Note that (−13 +√181)/6  0.0756. In the former case, tnn satisﬁes the condition of the inner
solution, therefore, welfare is given by
W Innn =
(123 + 43γ − γ3)α2
2(233 + 136γ + 23γ2 + γ3)
.
In the latter case, tnn does not satisfy the condition of the inner solution, we have to ﬁnd the
corner solution. However, correctly speaking, the maximization tax level is empty because the range
in this case is open set. If we are allowed to use ε that is positive and suﬃciently smal number, we
ﬁnd that the solution is α/(6 + γ)− ε. In this case, welfare is given by
WConn  (19 + 2γ − γ
2)α2
2(6 + γ)2
. ?27?
Next, we consider the case where α/(6 + γ) < t ≤ (3 + γ)α/(11 + γ). In this case, we calculate
the ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem of the government is
W˜ ′(t) =
(34 + 14γ + γ2)α− (197 + 40γ + 2γ2)t
(7 + γ)2
= 0. ?28?
To solve the above equation, we obtain
tnb =
(34 + 14γ + γ2)α
197 + 40γ + 2γ2
. ?29?
From the simple calculation, we easily ﬁnd that α/(6+ γ) < tnb < (3+ γ)α/(11+ γ). Therefore,
welfare is
Wnb =
(104− 2γ − γ2)α2
2(197 + 40γ + 2γ2)
. ?30?
Finally, we consider the case where (3 + γ)α/(11 + γ) < t. In this case, the equilibrium output
in the second stage does not depend on the tax level, so we can easily calculate welfare. Welfare is
as follows.
Wbb =
(59− 6γ − γ2)α2
2(11 + γ)2
.
From the above results, we ﬁnd that the government chooses the emission tax level in the fol-
lowing two cases: γ ∈ [0, (−13 + √181)/6) and γ ∈ [(−13 + √181)/6, 1]. Fortunately, we ﬁnd the
following relationships with respect to welfare:
Wnb = max{W Innn ,WConn ,Wnb,Wbb}. ?31?
Summing up these results, we obtain Proposition 1.
????? ? ?? ? ? ??? ?
??
Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 2 Case (BB): First, we consider Case (BB) where the emission constraints are bind-
ing for both ﬁrms, μ0 and μ1 > 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
∂LUq
∂x0
= α− μ0 − 2x0 − x1(1− γ) = 0, ?32?
∂LUq
∂a0
= −a0 + μ0 = 0, ?33?
∂LUq
∂μ0
= e¯− x0 + a0 = 0, ?34?
∂Lπq1
∂x1
= α− μ1 − x0 − 3x1 = 0, ?35?
∂Lπq1
∂a1
= −a1 + μ1 = 0, ?36?
∂Lπq1
∂a1
= e¯− x1 + a1 = 0. ?37?
To solve the above ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain
xBB0 =
(3 + γ)(α+ e¯)
11 + γ
, xBB1 =
2(α+ e¯)
11 + γ
,
aBB0 = μ
BB
0 =
(3 + γ)α− 8e¯
11 + γ
, aBB1 = μ
BB
1 =
2α− (9 + γ)e¯
11 + γ
,
eBB0 = e
BB
1 = e¯.
In this case, μBB0 and μ
BB
1 have to be positive, therefore, Case (BB) exists in the range where
e¯ < 2α/(9 + γ). From the comparison of μBB0 and μ
BB
1 , we ﬁnd that Case (NB) where μ0 = 0 and
μ1 > 0 does not exist.
Case (BN): Next, we consider Case (BN): μ0 > 0 and μ1 = 0. Increasing ai monotonically
decreases the value of the objective function of ﬁrm i and therefore, ﬁrm 1 does not invest the abate-
ment eﬀort at all, that is, a1 = 0. With respect to other variables, the ﬁrst-order conditions are as
follows:
∂LUq
∂x0
= α− μ0 − 2x0 − x1(1− γ) = 0, ?38?
∂LUq
∂a0
= −a0 + μ0 = 0, ?39?
∂LUq
∂μ0
= e¯− x0 + a0 = 0, ?40?
∂Lπq1
∂x1
= α− x0 − 3x1 = 0. ?41?
To solve them, we obtain
xBN0 =
(2 + γ)α+ 3e¯
8 + γ
, xBN1 =
2α− e¯
8 + γ
,
aBN0 = μ
BN
0 =
(2 + γ)α− (5 + γ)e¯
8 + γ
, aBN1 = μ
BN
1 = 0,
eBN0 = e¯, e
BN
1 =
2α− e¯
8 + γ
.
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As both μBN0 and e
BN
1 have to be positive, and therefore, Case (BN) exists when 2α/(9 + γ) <
e¯ < (2 + γ)α/(5 + γ).
Case (NN): Finally, we consider Case (NN) where the emission constraints are not binding for
both ﬁrms, μ0 and μ1 = 0. As mentioned above, we can easily ﬁnd that both ﬁrms choose their
abatement eﬀort level to be equal to 0. Therefore, we have to consider the choice of the output of
each ﬁrm. The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
∂LUq
∂x0
= α− 2x0 − x1(1− γ) = 0, ?42?
∂Lπq1
∂x1
= α− x0 − 3x1 = 0. ?43?
To solve the above ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain
xNN0 = e
NN
0 =
(2 + γ)α
5 + γ
, xNN1 = e
NN
1 =
α
5 + γ
,
aNN0 = a
NN
1 = 0.
This corresponds to the case where e¯ ≥ (2 + γ)/(5 + γ).
Summing up these results, we obtain Lemma 2.
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 2 Substituting xq0, x
q
1, a
q
0, and a
q
1 into W (x0, x1, a0, a1) in each case, we derive
welfare level in each case and we deﬁne Wˆ (e¯) = W (xq0, x
q
1, a
q
0, a
q
1).
First, we consider the case where e¯ < 2α/(9 + γ). In this case, we calculate the ﬁrst-order
condition of the maximization problem of the government is
Wˆ ′(e¯) =
(59− 6γ − γ2)α− (667 + 17γ − 15γ2 − γ3)e¯
(11 + γ)2
= 0.
To solve the above equation, we obtain
e¯BB =
(59− 6γ − γ2)α
ΔQ
?44?
From the simple calculation, we ﬁnd that e¯BB < 2α/(9 + γ).
Therefore, welfare is
WBB =
(6− γ)(59− 6γ − γ2)α2
2ΔQ
. ?45?
Next, we consider the case where 2α/(9 + γ) ≤ e¯ < (2 + γ)α/(5 + γ). In this case, we calculate
the ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem of the government is
Wˆ ′(e¯) =
γα− (11 + 2γ)e¯
8 + γ
= 0. ?46?
To solve the above equation, we obtain
e¯BN =
γα
11 + 2γ
. ?47?
????? ? ?? ? ? ??? ?
??
Here, we have to check whether e¯BN ∈ [2α/(9 + γ), (2 + γ)α/(5 + γ)) or not. From the simple
calculation, we easily ﬁnd that e¯BN < 2α/(9 + γ). Since Wˆ
′′(e¯) < 0, the solution is the corner
solution, that is, 2α/(9 + γ). Therefore, welfare is
WBN =
(5− γ)(7 + γ)α2
2(9 + γ)2
. ?48?
Finally, we consider the case where (2 + γ)α/(5 + γ) ≤ e¯. In this case, the equilibrium output in
the second stage does not depend on the quota level, so we can easily calculate welfare. Welfare is as
follows.
WNN =
(7− 3γ − γ2)α2
2(5 + γ)2
.
From the above results, the government chooses the emission quota level that maximizes social
welfare. From the simple calculation, we obtain the following results:
WBB = max{WBB ,WBN ,WNN}. ?49?
Summing up there results, we obtain Proposition 2.
Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 4 We compare welfare under an emission tax and an emission quota. We obtain
WT −WQ = (−370 + 4989γ + 831γ
2 − 98γ3 − 23γ4 − γ5)α2
2ΔTΔQ
. ?50?
Here, we deﬁne f(γ) = WT −WQ. First, we ﬁnd the following facts: f(0) < 0 and f(1) > 0. Second,
we easily ﬁnd f ′(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. To sum up the above results, we obtain γ¯ such that f(γ¯) = 0:
γ¯ is the only solution of WT −WQ = 0. Thus, we obtain Proposition 4.
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